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INTRODUCTION 
This symposium is on the future of Fourth Amendment law. 
This essay focuses on the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, 
which requires that evidence obtained from an unconstitutional 
search or seizure be excluded from a criminal prosecution.1 There 
was a time when the exclusionary rule or suppression doctrine 
was considered part and parcel of the amendment.2
                                                                                                                                  
 1 There are several different types of constitutional “exclusionary rules” that 
mandate the suppression of evidence in criminal prosecutions, and they are not 
identical in nature. This essay discusses exclusion mandated by Fourth Amendment 
rules. For an excellent and comprehensive discussion of constitutional exclusionary 
rules, see JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, CONSTITUTIONAL EXCLUSION: THE RULES, RIGHTS, AND 
REMEDIES THAT STRIKE THE BALANCE BETWEEN FREEDOM AND ORDER (2011). 
 However, the 
modern Supreme Court no longer sees the rule as anchored by the 
Fourth Amendment itself. In the mid-1970s, the Burger Court 
jettisoned the view that the exclusionary rule is a personal right; 
instead, the Court explained that the rule is a judicially created 
 2 See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (“The 
essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not 
merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be 
used at all.”); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (“If [documents illegally 
acquired can be] used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection 
of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and 
seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be 
stricken from the Constitution.”); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Up from 
Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 
251, 282 (1974) (stating that Weeks “recognized a personal fourth amendment right to 
exclusion”). 
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remedy to deter police violations of the amendment.3 The 
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have emphatically reaffirmed this 
view of the rule. Thus, the Court envisions the rule in strictly 
instrumental terms and not in remedial terms the way the 
Framers thought about remedies for rights violations.4
Since the mid-twentieth century, the exclusionary rule has 
been a controversial topic—both on and off the Court. After he 
retired from the Court, Potter Stewart compared its development 
in the Court to “a roller coaster track constructed while the roller 
coaster sped along.”
 
5 In a little-noticed opinion in 1979, then-
Justice Rehnquist claimed that “one of the central themes” 
presented in the sweep of the Court’s exclusionary rule 
jurisprudence, which, according to Rehnquist, began in 1914, “has 
been a continuing re-evaluation of past assumptions.”6 In that 
opinion, Rehnquist thought a reassessment of the exclusionary 
rule was overdue, and he urged his colleagues to consider 
whether, and to what extent, the rule should be retained.7
                                                                                                                                  
 3 See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 
414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). 
 This 
Article proposes a “reassessment” as well; it provides an 
evaluation of the Roberts Court’s intentions for the exclusionary 
rule. The Article, therefore, departs slightly from the theme of the 
symposium because it considers the current status of the 
 4 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 463, 501-07, 510-11 (2009) (“In accordance with the view that a 
right implies a remedy, the courts of the Founding generation held officers personally 
liable in damages for every wrongful search and seizure. Yet today the Supreme Court 
threatens to leave most violations of the Fourth Amendment without any remedy, not 
even on paper.”). For an interesting defense of the exclusionary rule from an 
originalist’s perspective, see Roger Roots, The Originalist Case for the Fourth 
Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) (contending that “the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is soundly based in the original understandings 
of the Constitution and the practices of the Founding period”). 
 5 Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, 
Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 
COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1366 (1983). Stewart also remarks that the rule suppresses 
evidence that would not have been available if the police had “complied with the 
commands of the fourth amendment in the first place.” Id. at 1392. Professor Susan 
Bandes rightly observes that “the controversial nature of the remedy has much to do 
with the controversial nature of the underlying right.” Susan A. Bandes, The Roberts 
Court and the Future of the Exclusionary Rule, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y, Apr. 
2009, at 1, available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Bandes%20Issue%20Brief.pdf. 
 6 California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916, 922 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 7 Id. at 928. 
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exclusionary rule under the Roberts Court,8
Despite Justice Kennedy’s 2006 declaration that “the 
continued operation of the exclusionary rule, as settled and 
defined by our precedents, is not in doubt,”
 as well as what the 
future holds for the rule. 
9 this Article 
demonstrates why this is not the case. Kennedy’s statement is 
noteworthy and has been accorded substantial weight primarily 
because it was made at a time when it was thought that four 
Justices (Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and 
Alito) were prepared to announce the demise of the exclusionary 
rule. Part I provides the background for the Court’s recent 
suppression rulings and Kennedy’s 2006 statement. Part II then 
considers the substance and worth of Kennedy’s statement as it 
pertains to Davis v. United States10 and Herring v. United 
States,11 the Court’s most recent rulings on the good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule. Part III considers the meaning 
of Kennedy’s statement in light of the attenuation rule announced 
in Hudson v. Michigan, which imposed a significant restriction on 
suppression as a remedy to deter Fourth Amendment violations.12
I. WHAT THE ROBERTS COURT EXCLUSIONARY RULE CASES ARE 
REALLY ABOUT 
 
The mainstream press reports on and reacts to the Court’s 
latest rulings on the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule with a 
subtle uniformity. In theory, the exclusionary rule requires that 
evidence acquired from an unconstitutional search or seizure be 
excluded from a criminal prosecution. In reality, the Court has 
                                                                                                                                  
 8 Professor Tom Clancy contends that when it comes to search and seizure law, “it 
is now Scalia’s Court.” Thomas K. Clancy, The Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment in 
the Roberts Court, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 191, 195 (2010). According to Clancy, “Scalia 
stands alone on the current Court. He has vision, force, and perseverance. It is his 
Court when it comes to the Fourth Amendment and it is his goal to make it irrelevant.” 
Id. at 196. 
 9 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 603 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). For a discerning analysis of Kennedy’s concurrence in 
Hudson, see James J. Tomkovicz, Hudson v. Michigan and the Future of Fourth 
Amendment Exclusion, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1819, 1832-33, 1848-49, 1880-81 (2008) 
[hereinafter Tomkovicz, the Future]. 
 10 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). 
 11 555 U.S. 135 (2009). 
 12 547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
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created many exceptions to the rule that have greatly reduced its 
applicability and impact. Nonetheless, much of the public assumes 
the rule prevents the conviction of guilty defendants. Ironically, 
twenty-one years have elapsed since the Court upheld application 
of the exclusionary rule in a search and seizure case; Justices 
Brennan and Marshall were still on the Court!13 Since then, the 
Court has decided six exclusionary rule cases, ruling for the 
government in every case.14
When the Court announces a new ruling addressing the 
exclusionary rule, as it did recently in Davis v. United States,
 
15
Lyle Denniston’s post concerning Davis on SCOTUSblog is 
representative of this phenomenon. Denniston, a veteran and 
respected Supreme Court reporter, wrote that the exclusionary 
rule “is fading further as a restraint on police evidence-
gathering,”
 
the reaction in the press is somewhat predictable. Inevitably the 
press reports that the rule has lost favor with the Justices, or the 
Court has created “another” exception to the rule that makes it 
harder for criminal defendants to suppress evidence obtained 
pursuant to illegal searches. But these same reports typically 
contain an observation that the Court seems unwilling to abolish 
the rule. 
16 and that the result in Davis indicates that a solid 
majority of the Court “is deeply skeptical of the rule [and] appears 
to be adding new Justices.”17 But Denniston’s column also noted 
that a majority of the Court “does not yet seem ready to cast aside 
altogether the ‘exclusionary rule.’”18
                                                                                                                                  
 13 See, e.g., James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990). 
 Two years earlier, after the 
 14 See Davis, 131 S. Ct. 2419; Herring, 555 U.S. 135; Hudson, 547 U.S. 586; Pa. Bd. 
of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995); 
New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990). 
 15 131 S. Ct. 2419. 
 16 Of course, the exclusionary rule does not “restrain” police evidence-gathering 
techniques—the Fourth Amendment does. The exclusionary rule, when it applies, 
merely makes the Fourth Amendment relevant. 
 17 Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: The Fading “Exclusionary Rule,” 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2011, 8:58 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=122938. 
 18 Id.; see also Craig M. Bradley, Red Herring or the Death of the Exclusionary 
Rule?, 45 TRIAL 52 (2009) [hereinafter Bradley, Red Herring] (describing the result in 
Herring as “another, fairly minor, chip out of the exclusionary rule”); Craig M. Bradley, 
Mixed Messages on the Exclusionary Rule, 42 TRIAL 56 (2006) [hereinafter Bradley, 
Mixed Messages] (“Four justices in the majority—Antonin Scalia (the author), Clarence 
Thomas, John Roberts, and Samuel Alito—appear ready to eviscerate the exclusionary 
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Court decided Herring v. United States,19 Adam Liptak, who 
covers the Supreme Court for the New York Times, adopted a 
more solemn view of the status of the exclusionary rule. 
Interestingly, Liptak’s story on Herring opened with the 
revelation that as an attorney in the Reagan White House in 1983, 
John Roberts “was hard at work on what he called in a 
memorandum ‘the campaign to amend or abolish the exclusionary 
rule.’”20 Roberts, of course, would later become Chief Justice of the 
United States and the author of Herring. Liptak’s story noted that 
Herring was significant because it was the first time the Court 
had permitted the admission of illegally obtained evidence when 
“all that was involved was isolated [police] carelessness.”21 Liptak 
also wrote that the result in Herring “suggested that the 
exclusionary rule itself might be at risk.”22 Liptak later observed 
that “the fate of the rule seems to turn on the views” of Justice 
Kennedy, who, according to Liptak, “has sent mixed signals” on 
whether the rule should be retained.23
While press coverage of the Court’s exclusionary rule cases is 
factually accurate, something is missing in these reports. What is 
not mentioned is a thoughtful awareness of the Court’s intentions 
 
                                                                                                                                  
principle. The rule was saved from this fate in Hudson only by a confusing (or 
confused) concurring opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy.”); Linda 
Greenhouse, Justices Will Hear Case on Evidence Suppression, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 
2008, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/20/us/20scotus.html 
(finding that the Justices “have made no secret of their desire to carve more exceptions 
out of the . . . exclusionary rule” and “Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion [in 
Hudson] appeared written to solicit further challenges to the rule’s application” 
(emphasis added)); Christine Dowling, A Massive But Dubious Look at California’s 
Death Penalty, CRIME & CONSEQUENCES BLOG (June 20, 2011, 1:29 PM), 
http://www.crimeandconsequences.com/crimblog/ 2011/06/news-scan-964.html (noting 
briefly that Alito’s opinion in Davis represents “further paring back applicability of the 
exclusionary rule”); Adam Liptak, U.S. Is Alone in Rejecting All Evidence if Police Err, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/19/us/19exclude.html (“The 
Supreme Court has in recent years whittled away at the exclusionary rule by limiting 
its applicability and creating exceptions to it. . . . [In] Hudson v. Michigan, Justice 
Scalia seemed to say that the exclusionary rule had outlived its original purpose.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 19 555 U.S. 135 (2009). 
 20 Adam Liptak, Justices Step Closer to Repeal of Evidence Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 31, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/31/washington/ 
31scotus.html. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
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for the exclusionary rule. Put simply, what is not being discussed 
is what these cases are really all about. Reporters, of course, are 
often not trained as lawyers and are not experts on constitutional 
criminal procedure. But members of the Court know their 
colleagues’ intentions better than the press. Thus, it was 
somewhat odd to read portions of Justice Breyer’s dissent in Davis 
questioning whether his colleagues had contemplated the full 
extent of their ruling’s ramifications. 
A. Davis Confirms the Direction of the Court 
At issue in Davis was whether the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule should extend to a case where police conduct a 
search relying on binding judicial precedent that is subsequently 
overruled. By a seven-to-two vote, the Court ruled that the 
exclusionary rule does not apply in this context.24 Davis provided 
a ringing endorsement of Herring’s edict that to trigger the rule 
police behavior must be sufficiently deliberate that suppression 
can meaningfully deter it and sufficiently culpable that such 
deterrence is “worth the price paid by the justice system.”25
[I]f the Court means what it now says, if it would place 
determinative weight upon the culpability of an individual 
officer’s conduct, and if it would apply the exclusionary 
rule only where a Fourth Amendment violation was 
“deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent,” then the “good 
faith” exception will swallow the exclusionary rule.
 As 
will be explained below, the result and reasoning in Davis was 
predictable and consistent with the goal of either abolishing or 
confining the exclusionary rule to egregious police misconduct. In 
his dissent, Justice Breyer questioned whether the Court was 
serious about the consequences of its reasoning: 
26
Perhaps Breyer’s comments were an effort to put the best 
spin on a decision that reaffirms what was said in Herring, which 
Professor Wayne LaFave, “America’s preeminent authority on the 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 24 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 (2011). 
 25 Id. at 2428 (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009)). 
 26 Id. at 2439 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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law of the Fourth Amendment,”27 describes as “flat-out wrong.”28 
Or, perhaps Breyer’s comments were offered in the hope that one 
or more of the Justices in the Davis majority would come to regret 
his or her decision to join the Davis opinion.29 In any event, unlike 
Justice Breyer, we have no doubt that the Davis majority, as well 
as the Herring majority, meant what it said when it asserted the 
exclusionary rule is applicable only where a Fourth Amendment 
violation was “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent.”30
Although some may think the result in Davis is simply more 
“chipping away” at the exclusionary rule and not cause for alarm, 
we disagree. The rationale of Davis confirms that the Court 
intends to limit application of the rule to deliberate, bad-faith, or 
recurring Fourth Amendment violations. But there is more. The 
reasoning and logic of Hudson v. Michigan,
 Put 
another way, rather than offer another warning of the possible 
future demise of the exclusionary rule, this Article emphasizes a 
different point: The revolution is over and the opponents of the 
exclusionary rule have won (Though we concede that some “mop-
up” work may be required to convince the lower courts that the 
Court meant what it said in Davis and Herring, namely, that 
exclusion is unwarranted in all cases where police reasonably 
believed their conduct complied with the law). 
31 another Roberts 
Court ruling, provides the Court an additional jurisprudential tool 
to bar exclusion even when police deliberately violate the Fourth 
Amendment. Hudson held violations of the Fourth Amendment 
knock-and-announce rule never require the exclusion of evidence. 
The tone and language of Justice Scalia’s opinion in Hudson 
exhibits contempt and opposition toward suppression.32
                                                                                                                                  
 27 Albert W. Alschuler, The Exclusionary Rule and Causation: Hudson v. Michigan 
and Its Ancestors, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1741, 1744 (2008) [hereinafter Alschuler, 
Exclusionary Rule]. 
 Hudson’s 
 28 Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s 
Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757, 758 (2009). 
 29 Although it is far too early to make any firm judgments about Justice Kagan’s 
views, liberals should worry that she joined Justice Alito’s opinion in Davis without 
qualification. 
 30 Herring, 555 U.S. at 144. 
 31 547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
 32 Clancy, supra note 8, at 202 (stating that at its “most fundamental level,” the 
result in Hudson “called into question the future of the exclusionary rule,” and that 
abolition of the rule “is Scalia’s clear aim; he has planted the seeds in Hudson and 
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holding was based, in part, on a novel interpretation of the 
attenuation rule, which is another exception to the exclusionary 
rule. As will be explained in Part III, the new vision of attenuation 
adopted in Hudson easily applies to Fourth Amendment 
protections besides the knock-and-announce rule, which means 
additional injunctions against the suppression doctrine. 
B. The Future of Suppression: Why All Eyes Are Rightly on 
Justice Kennedy 
Despite the rulings in Hudson, Herring, and Davis, some 
judges and legal commentators may still insist that the 
exclusionary rule is alive and well, although somewhat staggered. 
This view is undoubtedly fueled by the comments of Justice 
Kennedy, the crucial swing vote on the Roberts Court. In Hudson, 
Kennedy provided the fifth vote and concurred in the three key 
parts of Scalia’s opinion. Regarding the suppression doctrine, 
Kennedy said: “[T]he continued operation of the exclusionary rule, 
as settled and defined by our precedents, is not in doubt.”33 
Deciphering what Kennedy meant “turns out to be a challenge.”34 
Indeed, a skeptic might “wonder why, if the current operation of 
the exclusionary rule were not in doubt, such a declaration would 
be required.”35
                                                                                                                                  
needs one more vote to reap the harvest”). Professor Tomkovicz agrees that Hudson can 
be read as a sign that the Court is ready to abolish the rule. See Tomkovicz, the Future, 
supra note 9, at 1841-47 (explaining that when Hudson is broadly read, it “foreshadows 
and anticipates outright abolition” of the exclusionary rule). However, Tomkovicz 
believes that is not the best way to interpret Hudson—”at least for the present.” Id. at 
1847-49. 
 After reading Hudson, a few things came to mind: 
First, Justice Scalia had lined up the votes to repeal the rule, but 
Kennedy decided against that move and was signaling his support 
for the rule—at least for now. On the other hand, why would 
Kennedy join an opinion that laid the seeds for the destruction of 
 33 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 603 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment). 
 34 Sharon L. Davies & Anna B. Scanlon, Katz in the Age of Hudson v. Michigan: 
Some Thoughts on “Suppression as a Last Resort,” 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1035, 1066 
(2008). 
 35 Donald Dripps, The Fourth Amendment, The Exclusionary Rule, and the Roberts 
Court: Normative and Empirical Dimensions of the Over-Deterrence Hypothesis, 85 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 209, 235 (2010). 
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the rule?36
Justice Kennedy’s votes to join the majority opinions in 
Herring and Davis have caused us to reconsider his support for 
the rule and his claim that the rule is still operative. After these 
decisions, what type of police conduct triggers the exclusionary 
rule? And what is the meaning and scope of the rule under the 
logic of Hudson and Herring? Besides Kennedy’s comment in 
Hudson, there are additional reasons to focus on Kennedy’s votes 
and views as a window into the Court’s intentions for the rule. 
 Perhaps Kennedy got “cold feet” after reading Scalia’s 
draft in Hudson and was unwilling to go along. Alternatively, 
perhaps Kennedy had not decided what to do about the rule. A 
concurring opinion would permit Kennedy to join the result in 
Hudson, which moved the Court closer to abolishing the rule. But 
it would also allow him more time to think about repealing the 
rule outright. 
First, and most obviously, Kennedy is currently the pivotal 
swing vote on the Court.37 Professor Albert Alschuler, perhaps 
tongue-in-cheek, has described Kennedy as “the second most 
powerful man in America.”38
                                                                                                                                  
 36 David A. Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other Things: The 
Roberts Court Takes on the Fourth Amendment, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 283, 308 (2006) (“If 
he really believes in the continuing vitality of the exclusionary rule, it is an absolute 
mystery to me why he would cast the crucial fifth vote for an opinion that openly 
declared war on the exclusionary rule.”); Davies & Scanlon, supra note 34, at 1068 
(noting that Kennedy’s “cautionary language” in Hudson may mean he is unwilling to 
provide the fifth vote to repeal the exclusionary rule, yet “Kennedy’s willingness to 
align himself with the most wide-reaching points” in Scalia’s opinion “leaves this 
unclear”). 
 His votes obviously matter in 
 37 Adam Liptak, A Significant Term, with Bigger Cases Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, June 
29, 2011, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/us/29scotus.html 
(reporting that during the 2011 Supreme Court Term, twelve of the fourteen closely 
divided five-to-four cases were split between the four liberal Justices and four 
conservative Justices, with “Justice . . . Kennedy casting the decisive vote”); Adam 
Liptak, Roberts Court Shifts Right, Tipped by Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009, at 
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/01/us/01scotus.html (Liptak observes 
that during the 2009 term Justice Kennedy was in the majority for eighteen of the 
twenty-three cases where the Justices split five-to-four: “[I]n 16 [of these decisions], all 
four members of the court’s liberal wing were on one side and all four of its 
conservatives were on the other. And in between them was Justice Kennedy, the most 
powerful jurist in America.”). 
 38 Alschuler, supra note 4, at 476. Alschuler’s description differs from another 
description of Kennedy. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 199 (2007) (reporting that James Dobson, the founder and 
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suppression cases. In Hudson, Kennedy provided the crucial fifth 
vote for the result, and he joined Scalia’s novel analysis on the 
attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule, but refused to join 
another part of Scalia’s opinion. In Herring, Kennedy joined the 
majority, probably again providing the crucial fifth vote. More 
importantly, Kennedy joined Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in 
Herring without qualification, including the crucial declarations 
limiting the applicability of the exclusionary rule to deliberate, 
reckless, or grossly negligent police violations. These assertions in 
Herring—what Professor Alschuler calls the “‘big blast’ 
statements”39—were unprecedented and controversial,40 and thus, 
one might have thought in light of his comment in Hudson about 
preserving the exclusionary rule, Kennedy would have distanced 
himself from this reasoning.41
1. Justice Kennedy’s Influence in James v. Illinois 
 
In addition to being the crucial fifth vote, there is evidence 
that not only is Kennedy willing to stand alone in opposing 
extension of the exclusionary rule, but that he is also able to 
influence like-minded Justices to change their votes in order to 
restrict application of the rule. According to Justice Brennan’s 
private papers, in James v. Illinois, Kennedy’s dissent convinced 
Justices O’Connor and Scalia to change their vote in that case. 
James addressed whether the impeachment exception to the 
exclusionary rule, which allows prosecutors to use illegally 
acquired evidence to impeach a defendant who takes the stand, 
extends to all defense witnesses.42
In late August 1982, Chicago police detectives suspected 
fifteen-year-old Darryl James was involved in the murder and 
 
                                                                                                                                  
director of Focus on the Family, described Kennedy as “the most dangerous man in 
America”). 
 39 Alschuler, supra note 4, at 472. 
 40 LaFave, supra note 28, at 760-70. 
 41 Alschuler, supra note 4, at 476 (“As the indispensable fifth vote, Kennedy 
probably had the bargaining power to excise the ‘big blast’ statements from Chief 
Justice Roberts’s opinion if he wished to do so. He certainly could have disassociated 
himself from these statements in a concurring opinion.”); see also Bradley, Red 
Herring, supra note 18 (observing that it “was a mistake for Kennedy, if he wishes to 
preserve the exclusionary rule in its present form as he declared in Hudson, to go along 
with the four conservatives in [Herring]”). 
 42 James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990). 
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shooting of two teenagers. Witnesses to the shooting told police 
that the shooter had “reddish,” straight hair. These same 
witnesses also said that they had seen James several weeks 
earlier at a parade, and James’s hair was “reddish” and straight.43 
The day after the shooting, detectives found James at his mother’s 
beauty parlor sitting under a hair dryer. When he emerged, his 
hair was black and curly. After arresting James, the detectives 
questioned him about his prior hair color. James told the 
detectives that the previous day his hair had been reddish brown, 
long, and combed straight back. He also told the police that he had 
changed his hair color and style on the day of his arrest “in order 
to change his appearance.”44
After James was indicted for murder and attempted murder, 
the trial court ruled that James’s statements to the detectives 
were inadmissible because they were the fruit of an arrest without 
probable cause.
 
45 Although James did not testify at the trial, the 
defense called a family friend, Jewell Henderson, who testified 
that she had taken James to register for high school on the day of 
the shooting, and his hair was black and curly on that day.46 The 
prosecutor was allowed to impeach Henderson’s testimony by 
introducing James’s statements to the police.47 During closing 
arguments, the prosecutor told the jury that the State’s evidence 
contained an admission by the defendant that he changed the 
color of his hair. James was convicted of murder and attempted 
murder.48 The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the convictions, 
ruling that in order to prevent defendants from engaging in 
perjury “by proxy,” the impeachment exception extended to 
defense witnesses.49
At the conference discussion in James, only Chief Justice 
Rehnquist was clearly committed to affirming James’s 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 43 Id. at 310. 
 44 Id. at 309 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 45 Id. at 309-10. 
 46 Id. at 310. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 311. 
 49 People v. James, 528 N.E.2d 723, 730-31 (Ill. 1988), rev’d sub nom. James v. 
Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990). 
2012] NO MORE CHIPPING AWAY 1195 
conviction.50 All the remaining Justices, including O’Connor and 
Scalia, voted to reverse the conviction. Rehnquist appeared to 
concede that the ruling below expanded the impeachment 
exception beyond the Court’s prior rulings. Rehnquist also 
acknowledged that the challenged evidence “is not impeachment 
but rebuttal.”51 Nonetheless, Rehnquist voted to affirm on the 
“ground that the exclusionary rule must give way to truth 
seeking.”52 O’Connor told her colleagues that an affirmance 
“would encourage improper police conduct.”53 Scalia said that 
unless the Court was “going to discard the exclusionary rule,” he 
would vote to reverse.54 Kennedy signaled “he was on the fence,”55 
but ultimately voted to reverse.56
Justice Brennan assigned James to himself, and his first 
draft closely resembled the final published opinion. He stated his 
concern that expanding the impeachment to encompass the 
testimony of all defense witnesses “likely would chill some 
defendants from presenting their best defense—and sometimes 
any defense at all—through the testimony of others.”
 Thus, the conference vote was 
eight-to-one for reversal. 
57
                                                                                                                                  
 50 William J. Brennan, Jr., Case Histories 68-69 (Oct. Term, 1989) [hereinafter 
Case Histories] (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, The William 
J. Brennan Papers, Box II 8, Folder 5). 
 Brennan 
wrote this potential “chilling” effect changed the balance of values 
that informed the Court’s earlier impeachment rulings. While the 
Court’s prior cases recognized that defendants were not permitted 
to exploit tainted evidence as a shield for perjury, Brennan 
explained: “[I]t seems no more appropriate for the State to 
brandish such evidence as a sword with which to dissuade 
 51 William J. Brennan, Jr., Brennan’s Conference Notes, James v. Illinois (Oct. 6, 
1989) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, The William J. 
Brennan Papers, Box I 859, Folder 4). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Case Histories, supra note 50. 
 56 Harry A. Blackmun, Blackmun’s Conference Notes, James v. Illinois (Oct. 6, 
1989) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, The Harry A. 
Blackmun Papers, Box 553). 
 57 William J. Brennan, Jr., 1st Draft James v. Illinois 6 (Nov. 2, 1989) (on file with 
the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, The Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 
553). 
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defendants from presenting a meaningful defense through other 
witnesses.”58
Brennan also wrote an expanded impeachment exception 
would undermine the deterrent effects of exclusion. Authorizing 
the impeachment of defense witnesses was appreciably different 
than impeachment of defendants for at least two reasons: First, 
enlarging the impeachment exception would multiply the 
occasions on which tainted evidence could be used because defense 
witnesses outnumber testifying defendants. Second, the 
possession of tainted evidence gives the prosecution leverage not 
only to deter perjury, but it will “also deter defendants from 
calling witnesses in the first place, thereby keeping from the jury 
much probative exculpatory evidence.”
 
59
After Brennan’s first draft was circulated, Justices White, 
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens soon joined the opinion. “For a 
while, it even appeared that the Chief might switch his vote and 
join as well.” Rehnquist had told his law clerk “to tinker with a 
draft dissent but said that he wasn’t sure he would circulate 
anything.”
 
60
In the meantime, Kennedy wrote Brennan a letter stating 
that “it seems to me that reversal here requires a rule far more 
sweeping than I had thought at Conference.”
 
61 Kennedy also 
thought that the state’s position would not undermine the purpose 
of exclusion because he told Brennan that permitting “rebuttal of 
the false testimony here need not lower the level of deterrence.”62 
Kennedy, whose vote to affirm at the conference was shaky, 
informed Brennan that he would dissent.63 Kennedy, according to 
Brennan’s records, “was convinced after a strong lobbying from 
one of his clerks to write a dissent himself.”64
                                                                                                                                  
 58 Id. at 8. 
 The first draft that 
Kennedy circulated dismissed Brennan’s fears that permitting the 
use of tainted evidence would encourage future lawless behavior 
by the police. Kennedy pointed out that similar fears had been 
 59 Id. at 9. 
 60 Case Histories, supra note 50. 
 61 Letter from Justice Kennedy to Justice Brennan (Nov. 21, 1989) (on file with the 
Library of Congress, The Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 553). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Case Histories, supra note 50. 
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raised and rejected in prior cases.65 This concern—encouraging 
police misconduct—was the basis for O’Connor’s vote at 
conference. In addition, Kennedy argued that any gain in 
deterrence achieved by excluding the evidence was “marginal.”66
Within three hours of receiving Kennedy’s draft, Rehnquist 
and O’Connor joined it.
 
67 The next day, O’Connor wrote Brennan 
to explain that she found Kennedy’s dissent “persuasive” and thus 
was shifting her conference vote.68 After James was announced, 
Brennan’s private papers recalled that O’Connor found Kennedy’s 
dissent “‘persuasive’ (though it merely relied on the same 
arguments she had herself rejected at Conference).”69 Two weeks 
after Kennedy’s dissent circulated, Scalia joined and switched his 
conference vote.70
In the mid-1970s,
 Despite the defections of O’Connor and Scalia, 
Brennan still had five votes and his final opinion rejected an 
enlargement of the impeachment exception to the exclusionary 
rule. 
71 and then again in United States v. Leon, 
Justice Brennan complained that the Court was poised to abolish 
the exclusionary rule.72 Brennan had a different reaction after 
James was announced. He believed the result in James “casts into 
some doubt the frequent suggestion that the Court is on the verge 
of overruling Mapp v. Ohio and jettisoning the exclusionary rule 
altogether.”73
                                                                                                                                  
 65 Anthony M. Kennedy, 1st Draft James v. Illinois 6 (Nov. 21, 1989) (on file with 
the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, The William J. Brennan Papers, Box 
859, Folder 5). 
 For Brennan, the lesson learned in James was that 
Justice White, “the most ardent foe of the rule through his 
 66 Id. at 7. 
 67 Case Histories, supra note 50. 
 68 Letter from Justice O’Connor to Justice Brennan (Nov. 22, 1989) (on file with the 
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, The William J. Brennan Papers, Box 859, 
Folder 5). 
 69 Case Histories, supra note 50. 
 70 Letter from Justice Scalia to Justice Brennan (Dec. 7, 1989) (on file with the 
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, The William J. Brennan Papers, Box 859, 
Folder 5). 
 71 See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 365 (1974) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
 72 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 929, 959 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 73 Case Histories, supra note 50. 
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proposed ‘good faith’ exception, is still the key to preserving the 
rule against being gutted by attacks along other fronts.”74
Certainly, White’s support was essential for preventing an 
enlargement of the impeachment exception to the exclusionary 
rule. But another lesson learned from James was that Justice 
Kennedy was an opponent of the exclusionary rule. To be sure, 
Kennedy’s dissent in James did not call for repealing the rule, so 
the depth of his hostility to exclusion could not be judged by a 
single opinion. However, James did reveal that Kennedy wanted 
to restrict the rule, knowing that a new exception would impact 
future prosecutions involving defense witnesses and provide 
additional incentives for police to violate the constitutional rights 
of criminal suspects in order to obtain incriminating statements.
 
75
2. Justice Kennedy: Not So “Moderate” on the Exclusionary 
Rule 
 
In James, Kennedy stood ready to limit exclusion even when like-
minded, conservative Justices were initially unwilling to approve 
a broad, new exception to the rule.  
Justice Kennedy is often characterized as a “moderate” 
member of the Court’s conservative majority.76 His votes in a 1992 
Pennsylvania abortion case77 and in a 2003 case invalidating 
Texas’s criminal sodomy law78
                                                                                                                                  
 74 Id. 
 have led the public to perceive 
Kennedy as a different type of conservative than, say, Scalia and 
Thomas, or Chief Justice Roberts. But his voting record as a 
Justice (as opposed to his comment in Hudson) indisputably 
indicates that he is very much opposed to the exclusionary rule. In 
 75 Note this was shortly before the time when evidence surfaced that California law 
enforcement agencies were instructing officers that it was permissible to continue 
questioning suspects who have invoked their Miranda rights. See Charles D. 
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 132-40 (1998); id. at 134 
(describing a California training manual that tells instructors voluntary statements 
obtained from Miranda violations can be used to impeach a defendant at trial; as a 
basis for obtaining physical evidence; and for other investigative purposes, including 
locating contraband, identifying co-suspects, and locating witnesses). 
 76 See Bradley, Red Herring, supra note 18 (describing Kennedy as a “judicial 
moderate”). 
 77 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 78 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). In Lawrence, Kennedy authored the 
majority opinion. 
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contrast to other so-called “moderate” Justices who have sat on 
the Court in recent years, Kennedy has never voted to impose the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. By comparison, Justices 
O’Connor and Souter, neither of whom was a fan of the 
exclusionary rule, did vote to impose the rule at least one time. 
O’Connor voted for the defendant in Illinois v. Krull79 and Murray 
v. United States,80 while Souter voted for the defendant in 
Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott.81 According to 
the New York Times, O’Connor was also prepared to vote for the 
defendant in Hudson, but she resigned before the Court decided 
the case.82 And in a case that was initially argued in the 1983 
Term but decided on different grounds a year later, O’Connor 
wrote an unpublished opinion in which she dissented from the 
majority’s decision that the exclusionary rule does not apply in 
juvenile delinquency proceedings to bar the admission of evidence 
obtained from an illegal search by a school official.83
Finally, as a judge on the Ninth Circuit, Kennedy sat on the 
appellate panel that decided United States v. Leon,
 
84
                                                                                                                                  
 79 480 U.S. 340 (1987). 
 the 
progenitor of the good-faith exception that the Roberts Court has 
transformed and expanded. Kennedy dissented from the ruling 
ordering the exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to an invalid 
 80 487 U.S. 533 (1988). In Murray, Justice O’Connor joined Justice Marshall’s 
dissent. 
 81 524 U.S. 357 (1998). 
 82 See Linda Greenhouse, Court Limits Protection Against Improper Entry, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 16, 2006, at A28, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/16/ 
washington/16scotus.html; Charles Lane, Court Eases “No Knock” Search Ban; Illegally 
Collected Evidence Allowed, WASH. POST, June 16, 2006, at A01, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/15/AR2006061500 
730.html; see also David A. Moran, Waiting for the Other Shoe: Hudson and the 
Precarious State of Mapp, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1725, 1730-31 (2008). O’Connor participated 
when Hudson was originally argued on January 9, 2006. Id. at 1730. Her resignation 
was effective upon the nomination and confirmation of her successor, Samuel Alito, 
who took his seat on January 31, 2006. Id. at 1731. On April 19, 2006, the Court 
ordered re-argument in Hudson, which suggested that the Court was evenly split after 
O’Connor’s resignation. Id. Hudson was reargued on May 18, 2006 and decided nearly 
a month later, this time with Alito providing the fifth vote to affirm Hudson’s 
conviction. Id. 
 83 Sandra Day O’Connor, Dissent, 1st Draft New Jersey v. T.L.O. (June 12, 1984) 
(on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, The Harry A. Blackmun 
Papers, Box 414). 
 84 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
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search warrant. Like the other judges on the panel, Judge 
Kennedy declined to discuss a good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule. The closing paragraph of his short dissent, 
however, took a side-swipe at the exclusionary rule when he 
observed: “Whatever the merits of the exclusionary rule, its 
rigidities become compounded unacceptably when courts presume 
innocent conduct when the only common sense explanation for it 
is on-going criminal activity.”85
In sum, Justice Kennedy has been a key player on the Court 
in restricting the applicability and scope of the exclusionary rule. 
Without his votes, the opinions in Hudson and Herring would be 
very different. Thus, Court-watchers and legal scholars rightly 
focus on Kennedy because they believe his position will determine 
the future of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule.
 
86 While 
Kennedy’s influence and votes have been crucial, it is a mistake to 
think that the Court remains unsure about the future of the rule. 
Five Justices have already made their move, although they are 
not yet marching in lockstep together. Kennedy’s statement in 
Hudson on the continued viability of the rule tends to mislead 
rather than inform readers about the Roberts Court objectives for 
the rule. Professor Craig Bradley takes the view that a majority of 
the Court has decided “that the exclusionary rule must be 
reconsidered.”87
                                                                                                                                  
 85 United States v. Leon, No. 82-1093, 1983 WL 486883, at *3 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 
1983) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 This Article contends that the Roberts Court has 
already made its intentions known. If outright repeal is 
 86 In a comprehensive and perceptive article on Hudson v. Michigan, Professor 
Tomkovicz offers the view that Justice Kennedy has carefully positioned himself on the 
exclusionary rule: “It seems fair to say that Justice Kennedy concurred in the [Hudson] 
majority’s language and reasoning insofar as they addressed suppression for knock-
and-announce violations. He made it clear, however, that he was not participating in 
any exclusionary rule revolution that might be seen in Hudson’s undercurrents.” 
Tomkovicz, the Future, supra note 9, at 1849; see also id. at 1886 (noting that 
Kennedy’s “unavoidable declaration of allegiance to the exclusionary rule . . . indicates 
that [abolition of the rule] is not imminent”). Professor Tomkovicz’s analysis was 
provided before the results in Herring and Davis. 
 87 Craig M. Bradley, Reconceiving the Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary 
Rule, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211, 217 (2010), available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol73/iss3/6/; see also id. at 212 (noting that the 
Court is “dissatisfied with the mandatory aspect of the Mapp rule,” and that in Hudson 
and Herring, the “Court has indicated that the rule should be changed but has stopped 
short of mandating a broad alteration”). 
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unattainable, then the goal is continued prohibition on 
suppression as a remedy for entire categories of cases, as done for 
knock-and-announce cases in Hudson, and application of the rule 
only in cases of culpable police misconduct. 
The next two Sections of this Article ponder the Court’s most 
recent exclusionary rule decisions. Specifically, Part II considers 
what Herring and Davis tell us about the Roberts Court intentions 
for the suppression doctrine. Part III considers a specific section of 
Hudson v. Michigan and what it means for the continued 
operation of the exclusionary rule. Unlike Justice Kennedy, based 
on our reading of these cases, we think the “continued operation” 
of the exclusionary rule is very much in doubt. 
II. HERRING AND DAVIS: YES, THE COURT MEANT WHAT IT SAID 
Davis v. United States provides convincing evidence that the 
broad language in Herring v. United States on the applicability of 
the exclusionary was not obiter dicta, but instead was meant to be 
the core of Herring.88
A. Herring’s Move Towards Suppression for Only Deliberate 
and Culpable Conduct 
 In order to understand the significance of 
Davis, a description of the reasoning and result in Herring is 
helpful. 
While Bennie Dean Herring was checking on his impounded 
vehicle at the Coffee County, Alabama sheriff’s office, sheriff’s 
deputy, Mark Anderson, who was aware of Herring’s less-than-
perfect background, requested that the Coffee County warrant 
clerk run a warrant check on Herring.89
                                                                                                                                  
 88 See Alschuler, supra note 4, at 474 (“[Herring’s] ‘big blast’ statements look more 
like ratio decidendi (or the Court’s ‘reason for deciding’ as it did) than like obiter dicta 
(or things ‘said by the way.’) . . . [Herring’s big blast] statements appeared as part of a 
sustained argument.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 When the warrant search 
came back negative, Anderson had the warrant clerk call 
neighboring Dale County to see if there were any outstanding 
warrants for Herring. The warrant clerk for Dale County reported 
that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for Herring. This 
information was relayed to Anderson, who then arrested Herring 
as he was driving away from the impoundment lot. A search of 
 89 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009). 
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Herring’s person and vehicle incident to arrest revealed narcotics 
and a weapon.90 Ten to fifteen minutes later, officials learned that 
the warrant listed in the Dale County database should not have 
been there; the warrant had been recalled five months earlier. A 
negligent employee of the sheriff’s office should have removed the 
warrant.91 Herring’s arrest was illegal.92
Although Herring’s arrest violated the Fourth Amendment, 
the evidence discovered incident to his arrest was admitted at his 
federal narcotics prosecution under the good-faith exception. The 
lower courts ruled that suppression would serve no deterrent 
purpose. The officers who arrested Herring were innocent of 
wrongdoing; the failure to update the computer records was 
negligent, not a deliberate or tactical decision.
 
93
After losing his argument for exclusion in the lower federal 
courts, Herring appealed to the Supreme Court. Chief Justice 
Roberts’s opinion for a five-to-four majority has been the subject of 
considerable scrutiny and controversy. While some scholars have 
interpreted Herring narrowly,
 
94 it is not obvious why Roberts’s 
opinion should be read that way. To be sure, the issue confronting 
the Court was the one left unresolved in Arizona v. Evans,95
                                                                                                                                  
 90 Id. 
 
namely, whether the exclusionary rule applies to suppress 
evidence obtained from an illegal arrest that was prompted by 
errors in police recordkeeping. But Roberts’s opening paragraph 
suggests that his logic and holding apply beyond the specific facts 
 91 Id. at 138. 
 92 Id. 
 93 United States v. Herring, 492 F.3d 1212, 1218 (11th Cir. 2007) aff’d sub nom. 
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009). 
 94 Professor Orin Kerr has written that “Herring is a minor case. . . . I think it’s a 
narrow and interstitial decision, not one that is rocking the boat. In particular, I don’t 
see it as suggesting a general good faith exception for police conduct. Such a position 
would be an extraordinary shift in Fourth Amendment law that would effectively 
overrule a ton of cases. . . . The decision was quite narrow.” Orin Kerr, Responding to 
Tom Goldstein on Herring, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 14, 2009, 2:38 PM), 
http://volokh.com/posts/1231961926.shtml; see also Matthew J. Franck, 
Hyperventilating About the Exclusionary Rule, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Feb. 16, 2009, 11:21 
AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/50452/hyperventilating-about-
exclusionary-rule/matthew-j-franck# (describing Herring as “really pretty ordinary, 
and simply applies a principle established . . . in United States v. Leon,” 468 U.S. 897 
(1984), and “there’s no sign that the Roberts Court has lost its interest in maintaining” 
the exclusionary rule). 
 95 514 U.S. 1 (1995). 
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of the case. Roberts asks: “What if an officer reasonably believes 
there is an outstanding arrest warrant, but that belief turns out to 
be wrong because of a negligent bookkeeping error by another 
police employee?”96 The Chief Justice provides the following 
answer: Exclusion of evidence obtained from an illegal arrest is 
not a mechanical reaction to a Fourth Amendment violation. 
Rather, “the question turns on the culpability of the police and the 
potential of exclusion to deter wrongful police conduct. Here the 
error was the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the 
arrest. We hold that in these circumstances . . . [exclusion is not 
appropriate].”97 Of course, the error in Herring involved 
negligence by a police employee in another county, but Roberts’s 
framing of the issue suggested that error by an officer in the same 
police department should not result in exclusion either.98
Professors LaFave and Alschuler have already provided 
detailed and compelling critiques of Roberts’s opinion.
 
99 We agree 
with much of their analysis and criticism of Herring. Our 
emphasis is on Herring’s statements regarding the type of police 
conduct that justifies exclusion as a remedy. Specifically, Herring 
stated: “To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be 
sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, 
and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price 
paid by the justice system.”100 Relying on prior cases, Herring 
asserted: “[T]he exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, 
reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances 
recurring or systemic negligence.”101 Roberts then noted that 
Deputy Anderson’s illegal arrest of Herring did “not rise to that 
level.”102
                                                                                                                                  
 96 Herring, 555 U.S. at 136-37. 
 
 97 Id. at 137. 
 98 Alschuler, supra note 4, at 471 (“Roberts asked about the significance of a 
negligent error by any officer other than the one who conducted the search. His opinion 
implied that even negligence by another officer in the same police agency might be 
regarded as ‘attenuated.’”). 
 99 See Alschuler, supra note 4; LaFave, supra note 28; see also Jennifer E. Laurin, 
Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. 
REV. 670, 679-88 (2011) (explaining the reasoning of Herring is a significant departure 
from the Court’s prior cases). 
 100 Herring, 555 U.S. at 144. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
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A few points about this language should be highlighted. First, 
it is a mistake to interpret this part of the opinion as dicta. 
Roberts’s description of the level of police culpability necessary to 
trigger exclusion was stated without qualification. More 
importantly, this language does not mention “attenuation.” Unlike 
the unexplained references to “attenuation” in other parts of his 
opinion, the discussion on the need for culpable police conduct to 
trigger the exclusionary rule appears as part of a “sustained 
argument.”103 Furthermore, no ruling prior to Herring had 
asserted or even implied that suppression turns on deliberate or 
grossly negligent police conduct.104
Second, it is also a mistake to think that this language from 
Herring will not be cited by the Court when future defendants 
seek application of the exclusionary rule to ordinary Fourth 
Amendment violations. To be sure, the “holding” of Herring 
appeared to be bound by the facts. But the opening paragraph of 
Herring, which frames the issue before the Court, suggests that 
the Chief Justice sees the case as one involving a broader concern 
beyond the specific facts of the case. If the Chief Justice truly 
intended a narrow reading of Herring, he certainly knew how to 
write an opinion that would convey to the lower courts that 
Herring’s holding and reasoning were confined to negligent 
recordkeeping cases. If Herring was simply deciding the issue left 
open in Arizona v. Evans, the “big blast” statements were 
unnecessary to decide the case. It borders on the naïve to think 
these statements were heedlessly included in the opinion. Rather, 
the statements were a purposeful addition, as the Roberts Court 
intends to restrict the exclusionary rule to instances of culpable 
police behavior. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 103 Alschuler, supra note 4, at 474. 
 104 Alschuler, supra note 4, at 488-89 (“No decision prior to Herring . . . had 
suggested or implied that the exclusionary rule should be limited [to culpable police 
misconduct]. . . . Herring’s ‘big blast’ statements would preclude exclusion even when 
an officer was not ‘objectively reasonable’ as long as he was not grossly negligent. 
Declaring that this standard had been ‘laid out in our cases’ took chutzpa.”); LaFave, 
supra note 28, at 763-68. 
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B. Davis Not Only Embraces, but Expands Herring 
Notwithstanding the language on culpable police conduct, 
erudite scholars rejected the claim that Herring was cause for 
alarm.105 Justice Alito’s opinion in Davis, however, indicates that 
six (and maybe seven) of the current Justices read Herring the 
way we read Herring. As noted above, Davis addressed whether 
the exclusionary rule applies when police perform a search in 
reliance on “binding [judicial] precedent” that is later overruled.106 
Davis involved a police search of a car that was lawful at the time 
of the search, but that was later overruled by the Court while 
Davis’s appeal was pending. When Davis arrived at the Court, few 
thought that Davis had any chance of winning because police 
reasonably relied on existing law to perform the search. Although 
all agreed that the search violated the Fourth Amendment, 
excluding the evidence found from the now-illegal search would 
serve no deterrent purpose because the officer was neither 
culpable nor did anything wrong when performing the search. As 
far as the good-faith exception went, the facts in Davis appeared 
to be on all fours with Herring and the Court’s previous good-faith 
cases.107
Indeed, Justice Alito held that because exclusion “would do 
nothing to deter police misconduct” and would impose a high cost 
to “both the truth and the public safety” the rule does not apply in 
this context.
 
108
                                                                                                                                  
 105 See, e.g., Bradley, Red Herring, supra note 18 (observing that Herring “is only a 
slight change from Arizona v. Evans,” and that Herring “represents another, fairly 
minor, chip out of the exclusionary rule since most illegal searches will not be 
attenuated from the error that caused them”). But Bradley did caution that if four of 
the Justices “get their way, the major pillar upholding Fourth (and Fifth) Amendment 
rights, will collapse.” Id. 
 His opinion explains, relying on Herring, that the 
deterrence benefits of suppression vary with the culpability of the 
 106 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 (2011). 
 107 At first glance, Davis might qualify “as a ‘no-brainer.’” See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.3 at 21 (4th ed. 
Supp. 2011-2012). But as Fourth Amendment scholars know, the Court’s rulings in this 
area often require close scrutiny. According to Professor LaFave, “some questions exist 
with respect to either the result or the majority’s reasoning [in Davis] that might give 
one pause.” Id. Moreover, the result in Davis raises significant disincentives for future 
defendants to challenge search and seizure practices that might result in the creation 
of new Fourth Amendment law. See Orin Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of 
the Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEO. L.J. 1077 (2011). 
 108 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423-24. 
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challenged police misconduct: “When the police exhibit 
‘deliberate,’ ‘reckless,’ or ‘grossly negligent’ disregard for Fourth 
Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and 
tends to outweigh the resulting costs.”109 On the other hand, Alito 
also elaborates, in line with Herring’s focus on culpable police 
conduct, that when police search or seize “with an objectively 
‘reasonable good-faith belief’ that their conduct is lawful,”110 or 
when their unconstitutional behavior “involves only simple, 
‘isolated’ negligence,”111 deterrence “loses much of its force,” and 
exclusion is not required.112
Significantly, Davis expands Herring, a point recognized by 
Justice Breyer’s dissent.
 
113 Recall that Herring’s “holding” 
suggested that exclusion is not required in circumstances where 
the constitutional offense “was the result of isolated negligence 
attenuated from the arrest.”114 Commentators and lower courts 
that interpreted Herring narrowly believed that the attenuation 
element would contain Herring’s impact and prevent its logic from 
applying to garden-variety Fourth Amendment violations.115
                                                                                                                                  
 109 Id. at 2427 (emphasis added) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 
144 (2009)). Notice that Davis is unwilling to categorically state that when police are 
culpable, exclusion is required. Alito will only say that such conduct provides a “strong” 
reason to exclude and that exclusion “tends” to outweigh the costs to society. 
 
 110 Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984)). 
 111 Id. at 2427-28 (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 137). 
 112 Id. at 2428 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 919). 
 113 Id. at 2439-40 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 114 Herring, 555 U.S. at 137 (emphasis added). 
 115 See, e.g., United States v. Green, Criminal No. 1:08 CR 0041, 2009 WL 230890, 
at *10 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2009) (granting the suppression motion following an officer’s 
illegal search and explaining that “the Supreme Court clearly restricted the reach of 
Herring’s limitation on the exclusionary rule to police misconduct that is ‘attenuated’ 
from the arrest. Unlike the case at bar, Herring involved a computer error by police 
that was remote in both time and location from the unlawful arrest.”); State v. Handy, 
18 A.3d 179, 187-88 (N.J. 2011) (affirming the suppression motion and concluding that 
although the police officer reasonably relied on a mistake by a dispatcher, the conduct 
of the dispatcher was not sufficiently attenuated from the arrest to trigger the good-
faith exception in Herring); State v. Hess, 785 N.W.2d 568, 579 (Wis. 2010) (explaining 
that the Supreme Court “held that the police conduct in Herring did not warrant 
exclusion because it ‘was the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest,’” 
and holding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply to a 
civil bench warrant that was invalid when issued) (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 137); 
Bradley, Red Herring, supra note 18 (“[Herring’s holding] won’t apply to the vast 
majority of cases, despite the apparent attempt of the majority opinion to establish a 
new approach to the exclusionary role [sic] that would apply to all cases. In most cases, 
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Interestingly, Tom Goldstein, a Supreme Court litigator who 
represented Herring, discounted this view of Herring’s scope. 
Goldstein conceded that the attenuation element temporarily 
contained the reach of Herring’s holding, but he observed that “the 
logic of [Herring] spans far more broadly, and the next logical 
step—which I predict is 2 years away—is abandoning the 
‘attenuation’ reference altogether.”116 Goldstein’s prediction was 
dead-on. When describing the type of police conduct that justifies 
suppression, Davis, decided two years after Herring, never 
mentions “attenuation.”117
C. What the Court’s Good-Faith Exception in Herring and Davis 
Means for the Future of the Exclusionary Rule 
 
Two years ago, one of us predicted that the Roberts Court 
would eventually repeal the exclusionary rule.118
After Herring, will the Court countenance the suppression of 
evidence obtained after an officer negligently, but in good faith, 
decides she has probable cause to search a car or make an arrest, 
 We have no 
doubt that the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and 
Alito are ready to abolish the exclusionary rule. But even if we are 
wrong about that, the logic and results in Herring, and now Davis, 
move the Court nine-tenths of the way toward outright 
abolishment. Even before the recent holding in Davis, Herring’s 
“big blast” statements significantly undermined and confined 
application of the exclusionary rule to a small number of cases. 
Put simply, the Chief Justice’s opinion in Herring laid the 
foundation for a general good-faith exception for routine search 
and seizure cases. 
                                                                                                                                  
the police error will not be ‘attenuated’ from the search, but will be committed by the 
same officers who did the searching.”). 
 116 Tom Goldstein, The Surpassing Significance of Herring, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 14, 
2009, 11:32 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/01/the-surpassing-significance-of-
herring/. 
 117 See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 1.3 at 28 n.181.30 (4th ed. Supp. 2011-2012) (“The Davis majority’s 
‘restatement’ of the Herring rule omits its most significant limitation, namely, that 
‘negligent’ conduct by police supports a good-faith claim only if the negligence was 
‘attenuated.’”). 
 118 Tracey Maclin, Joseph Lipsitt Faculty Research Scholar, Bos. Univ. Sch. of L., 
The Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule, Address to the Hoffinger Criminal 
Justice Colloquium, New York University School of Law (Feb. 24, 2009). 
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or sufficient suspicion to conduct a Terry frisk? If the officer’s 
judgment is wrong, but not culpable, and there is no proof that she 
has engaged in recurring violations of this kind, the logic of 
Herring dictates that exclusion is not justified. Why would the 
exclusionary rule apply in such circumstances? “[A]n officer who 
conducts a search that he believes complies with the Constitution 
but which, it ultimately turns out, falls just outside the Fourth 
Amendment’s bounds is no more culpable than an officer who 
follows erroneous ‘binding precedent,’”119
Or consider what Professor Richard McAdams had to say 
about the logic of Herring even when viewed as a case that merely 
decides the issue left open in Arizona v. Evans. Shortly after the 
oral argument in Herring, McAdams noted that if the Court was 
unwilling to distinguish between the errors of judicial employees 
and police employees who operate databases, the Court was 
unlikely to “draw a line between a sworn field officer and a police 
clerk.”
 or one who relies upon 
an arrest warrant that had been recalled five months earlier. 
120 As McAdams saw it, if an officer can rely in good faith on 
the error of a police clerk, as Herring now permits, she can likely 
rely in good faith on the error of a fellow detective. If a court will 
not exclude when Detective A relies on a negligent error by 
Detective B, then why exclude when Detective A relies on her own 
negligent, but isolated, error?121
If under Herring, only culpable or deliberate violations of the 
Fourth Amendment merit suppression, then a great 
numberperhaps the overwhelming majorityof unreasonable 
searches and seizures will be immunized from the exclusionary 
rule. After all, most search and seizure violations addressed by 
courts in suppression hearings across the nation involve good-
faith or negligentnot deliberately culpablemistakes by police 
officers. Before and after Herring, Fourth Amendment scholars 
made this point. The Justices know this as well.
 
122
                                                                                                                                  
 119 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2439 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 Justice Breyer, 
 120 Richard McAdams, Wither the Exclusionary Rule?, U. CHI. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG 
(Oct. 29, 2008), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2008/10/wither-the-excl.html. 
 121 Id. 
 122 See, e.g., Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2439 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that most 
suppression motions challenge conduct where, “police, uncertain of how the Fourth 
Amendment applied to the particular factual circumstances they faced, will have acted 
in objective good faith. Yet, in a significant percentage of these instances, courts will 
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however, seemed surprised, if not alarmed, by the prospect of the 
Herring–Davis logic applying to routine violations of the Fourth 
Amendment. He noted: 
[I]f the Court means what it now says, if it would place 
determinative weight upon the culpability of an individual 
officer’s conduct, and if it would apply the exclusionary 
rule only where a Fourth Amendment violation was 
“deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent,” then the “good 
faith” exception will swallow the exclusionary rule.123
Surely Breyer knows his colleagues better than that. Of 
course, the Court meant what it said in Herring and Davis. That 
was the point of Herring—to confine application of the 
exclusionary rule to the type of purposefully, bad-faith police 
misconduct seen in Mapp v. Ohio.
 
124 The Herring majority knows 
that egregious Fourth Amendment violations are rarely seen in 
suppression hearings. Does Justice Breyer really believe that his 
colleagues have not made up their minds to extend the Herring–
Davis logic to routine violations of the Fourth Amendment? Why 
the repeated use of the term “if” by Breyer? That is exactly what 
the majority intends to do. And as Breyer recognizes, some lower 
courts are already heading in that direction after reading 
Herring.125
                                                                                                                                  
find that the police were wrong.”); Stewart, supra note 5, at 1388-89 (observing civil 
damages lawsuits and criminal prosecutions “punish and perhaps deter the grossest of 
violations, as well as governmental policies that legitimate these violations. They 
compensate some of the victims of the most egregious violations. But they do little, if 
anything, to reduce the likelihood of the vast majority of fourth amendment 
violations—the frequent infringements motivated by commendable zeal, not 
condemnable malice.”). 
 
 123 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2439 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 124 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 125 See, e.g., United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236, 243 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that 
“the Herring Court’s emphasis” weighed in favor of not suppressing illegally seized 
evidence “unless the officers engage in ‘deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent 
conduct’”) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009)); United States 
v. Julius, 610 F.3d 60, 66-67 (2d Cir. 2010) (remanding to the district court for a 
determination of “whether the degree of police culpability in this case rose beyond mere 
administrative negligence such that application of the rule is necessary” to deter 
Fourth Amendment violations under the “cost/benefit analysis required by Herring.”); 
United States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 140, 151, 154 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that “the 
Supreme Court has instructed that the exclusionary rule should only be applied when 
‘police conduct [is] . . . sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, 
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D. Justice White’s Roadmap for the Roberts Court’s Good-Faith 
Exception 
Perhaps one reason why judges and scholars have been 
reluctant to believe that the Herring majority really does intend to 
limit suppression to bad-faith or egregious search and seizure 
violations is the fact that the Court has never adopted this 
position. Although there is no precedent for this objective, Justice 
White provided a blueprint for reaching this goal. 
In the 1970s, Justice White began urging his colleagues to 
adopt a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. White’s 
proposal was always framed in expansive terms, even in cases 
where a narrower exception was available. For example, in Stone 
v. Powell,126 Nevada police relied upon a vagrancy statute to 
arrest Lloyd Powell. In a companion case, Nebraska law 
enforcement officers obtained incriminating evidence against 
David Rice pursuant to a search warrant.127 The statute and 
warrant were later declared unconstitutional, and the lower 
courts suppressed evidence obtained incident to the arrest of 
Powell and search of Rice’s home. A majority of the Court 
ultimately ruled in Stone v. Powell that where a state has 
provided a defendant a full and fair opportunity to raise a Fourth 
Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require a state 
prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief because illegally 
acquired evidence was admitted at his trial.128 In his dissent in 
Stone v. Powell, Justice White opposed restricting the remedies of 
habeas petitioners.129
                                                                                                                                  
and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid’” and holding that 
the exclusionary rule does not apply because the officer’s actions did “not amount to 
‘deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct’” or indicate “‘recurring or systemic 
negligence’”) (citing Herring, 555 U.S. at 144); People v. McDonough, 917 N.E.2d 590, 
594 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (claiming that “absent police misconduct, the exclusionary rule 
does not apply . . . [I]f the justification for the exclusionary rule is solely to deter police 
misconduct (as the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Herring), then the necessary condition 
precedent for the exclusionary rule’s application is police misconduct.”). 
 But White also thought that the Court 
should substantially limit the scope of the suppression doctrine 
and adopt a good-faith exception. White eschewed a modification 
 126 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 481-82 (footnote omitted). 
 129 Id. at 536 (White, J., dissenting). 
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of the exclusionary rule that would permit the admission of 
evidence where police either rely on a statute or warrant that is 
later declared invalid. Instead, White proposed a modification of 
the exclusionary rule that would apply in every case: 
[S]o as to prevent its application in those many 
circumstances where the evidence at issue was seized by 
an officer acting in the good-faith belief that his conduct 
comported with existing law and having reasonable 
grounds for this belief. . . . When law enforcement 
personnel have acted mistakenly, but in good-faith and on 
reasonable grounds, and yet the evidence they have seized 
is later excluded, the exclusion can have no deterrent 
effect.130
In the early 1980s, White continued to push for an expansive, 
general good-faith exception. Around the time that John Roberts 
finished his clerkship with Justice Rehnquist and started a four-
year stint in the office of President Reagan’s White House counsel, 
White convinced his colleagues to order reargument in Illinois v. 
Gates so that the Court could consider a good-faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule.
 
131
White’s reargument order was broadly framed. The order did 
not ask the parties to address whether the exclusionary rule 
should be modified to allow the admission of evidence obtained by 
police acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant that was 
later declared invalid, which tracked the facts in Gates. White was 
seeking a restriction of the exclusionary rule that went beyond the 
facts in Gates. White’s order asked the parties to address whether 
the rule should be modified when evidence was obtained “in the 
reasonable belief that the search and seizure at issue was 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment.”
 
132
                                                                                                                                  
 130 Id. at 538-40. 
 Framed this way, a 
good-faith exception would be available in every case of a Fourth 
Amendment violation and would not be confined to the narrow 
category of cases where police rely on a warrant that is 
subsequently ruled illegal. 
 131 William J. Brennan, Jr., Case Histories xxix-xxxi (Oct. Term, 1982) (on file with 
the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, The William J. Brennan Papers, Box 
11:7, Folder 11). 
 132 Illinois v. Gates, 459 U.S. 1028, 1028 (1982). 
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When the parties in Gates submitted new briefs on the good-
faith issue that the Court had asked them to address, the amicus 
brief filed by President Reagan’s Solicitor General urged the Court 
to modify the exclusionary rule along the exact lines proposed by 
White in his Stone v. Powell dissent. Although the Gates majority 
ultimately decided not to reach the good-faith issue, Justice 
White’s concurrence provided a framework for a broad good-faith 
exception that went beyond the facts in Gates. White began his 
Gates concurrence by reaffirming the position he took in Stone v. 
Powell: “[T]he exclusionary rule is an inappropriate remedy where 
law enforcement officials act in the reasonable belief that a search 
and seizure was consistent with the Fourth Amendment.”133 
Acknowledging that suppression deters some police misconduct, 
White asserted, “it is apparent as a matter of logic that there is 
little if any deterrence when the rule is invoked to suppress 
evidence obtained by a police officer acting in the reasonable belief 
that his conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment.”134
White did not pull any punches on the scope of his good-faith 
exception: “There are several types of Fourth Amendment 
violations that may be said to fall under the rubric of ‘good 
faith.’”
 
135 He recognized that a good-faith exception would be 
available in cases of warrantless arrests—occasions where judges 
disagree on the issue of probable cause, “no matter how 
reasonable the grounds for arrest appeared to the officer and 
though reasonable men could easily differ on the question.”136 But 
White also signaled, in a footnote discussing the concept of judicial 
integrity, that his good-faith exception was available where police 
have “reasonably erred in assessing the facts, mistakenly 
conducted a search authorized under a presumably valid statute, 
or relied in good faith upon a warrant not supported by probable 
cause.”137 In such cases, “the question of exclusion must be viewed 
through a different lens,” and the “integrity of the courts is not 
implicated.”138
                                                                                                                                  
 133 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246 (1983) (White, J., concurring). 
 White did note, however, that exclusion would 
remain available for “searches and seizures perpetrated in 
 134 Id. at 260. 
 135 Id. at 262. 
 136 Id. (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539-40 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)). 
 137 Id. at 259 n.14. 
 138 Id. 
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intentional and flagrant disregard of Fourth Amendment 
principles.”139
Although no other Justice joined White’s concurrence in 
Gates, a year later White would write for a majority in United 
States v. Leon, which was the first case to adopt a good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule.
 
140 Leon held that the rule does 
not forbid the use in the prosecution’s case-in-chief of evidence 
obtained by police acting in reasonable reliance on a search 
warrant issued by a judge but later determined to be unsupported 
by probable cause.141 White also authored the companion case to 
Leon, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, which concluded that the 
exclusionary rule should be modified to permit the admission of 
evidence seized in reasonable reliance on a search warrant 
supported by probable cause but later held invalid due to the 
failure to specify the items to be seized.142 Although the holdings 
in Leon and Sheppard were limited to cases where police obtained 
warrants, White sprinkled dicta throughout his opinions 
suggesting a good-faith exception would embrace various types of 
reasonable police mistakes.143
Justice White’s many opinions outlining the parameters of 
the good-faith exception provide the roadmap for the Roberts 
Court’s goal of limiting the exclusionary rule to bad faith or 
egregious Fourth Amendment violations. Concededly, Herring and 
Davis can be read narrowly, but when it comes to the exclusionary 
rule, we believe that the Roberts Court does not have a narrow 
 This language was consistent with 
the expansive good-faith exception White had proposed in his 
separate opinion in Gates and in his dissent in Stone v. Powell. 
                                                                                                                                  
 139 Id. 
 140 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 141 Id. at 926. 
 142 Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 989-91 (1984). 
 143 See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 (asserting that the exclusionary rule “cannot be 
expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement 
activity”); id. at 908 (noting “when law enforcement officers have acted in objective 
good faith or their transgressions have been minor,” the benefit afforded the defendant 
“offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system”) (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 
465, 490 (1976)); see also I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1056 (1984) (White, 
J., dissenting) (relying on Leon for the assertion that if immigration officers “neither 
knew nor should have known that they were acting contrary to the dictates of the 
Fourth Amendment, evidence will not be suppressed even if it is held that their 
conduct was illegal”). 
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agenda. To ensure that the rest of the lower courts receive the 
message that suppression is justified only upon a showing of 
culpable police conduct, the Court will probably have to take a 
case involving a routine search and seizure violation, for example, 
a car search or Terry frisk case. If we are right about the 
intentions of the Roberts Court, the Court will rule that the 
exclusionary rule does not apply unless there is proof of culpable 
police conduct. If this occurs, the exclusionary rule will no longer 
matter. As Justice Breyer described it in his Davis dissent, if 
suppression of illegally acquired evidence is warranted only when 
the police are deliberately or recklessly culpable, “then the good-
faith exception will swallow the exclusionary rule.”144
III. BEYOND GOOD-FAITH: APPLYING HUDSON V. MICHIGAN’S 
LOGIC TO BAR SUPPRESSION AS A CATEGORICAL MATTER 
 
Detroit, Michigan police possessed a lawful warrant to search 
for drugs and guns in Booker Hudson’s home. After announcing 
their presence, police waited only three to five seconds before 
entering. Inside they found Hudson, drugs, and a gun.145 After 
Hudson was convicted of narcotics and gun possession, Michigan 
prosecutors conceded the manner of entry violated the Fourth 
Amendment’s knock-and-announce rule.146 Thus, the only issue 
confronting the Justices in Hudson v. Michigan was whether 
suppression is appropriate when police infringe the knock-and-
announce rule.147
A. Justice Scalia’s Three Rationales in Hudson 
 
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Hudson held that 
suppression is never a remedy for knock-and-announce violations. 
Scalia’s ruling rested on three distinct and independent bases. 
First, he explained that the unlawful entry “was not a but-for 
cause of obtaining the evidence.”148
                                                                                                                                  
 144 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2439 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 The failure to comply with the 
 145 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 588 (2006). 
 146 Id. at 590. 
 147 While Justice Scalia’s opinion does not frame the issue this way, surely this was 
the issue addressed and decided by the Court. See Tomkovicz, the Future, supra note 9, 
at 1822, 1823 nn.13 & 19. 
 148 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 592. 
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announcement rule had no causal nexus to obtaining the evidence 
because whether the police would have complied with the 
Constitution or not, they would have executed the warrant and 
discovered the evidence. This conclusion was sufficient to affirm 
Hudson’s conviction and end the case, but Scalia had more on his 
mind.149
Second, Scalia explained that even if the constitutional 
violation was the but-for cause of obtaining the evidence, 
admission of the evidence is nevertheless proper when the 
connection between the police illegality and the discovery of the 
evidence is “too attenuated to justify exclusion.”
 
150 Here, Scalia 
invoked the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule. He 
accurately noted that in prior cases, suppression was denied 
where the nexus between the Fourth Amendment violation and 
the seizure of evidence was “remote.”151 Although Scalia did not 
acknowledge it, this traditional attenuation exception was 
unavailable in Hudson since the discovery of the evidence 
immediately followed on the heels of the illegal entry, and there 
were no intervening circumstances that severed the connection 
between the violation and discovery.152
Undeterred by prior precedent, Justice Scalia created a new 
form of attenuation. He explained, “Attenuation also occurs when, 
even given a direct causal connection, the interest protected by the 
constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be 
served by suppression of the evidence obtained.”
 
153
                                                                                                                                  
 149 See also Tomkovicz, the Future, supra note 9, at 1825 (“Justice Scalia could have 
ended his opinion at this point. His conclusion about the absence of a causal connection 
between the knock-and-announce violation and the discoveries in the home foreclosed 
application of the Mapp rule to this case. Justice Scalia continued, however, turning to 
additional, broader grounds for declaring the [exclusionary] rule inapplicable to 
Hudson’s gun and drugs.”); id. at 1825 n.31 (“The fact that [Scalia] did not pen a short, 
simple opinion that rested solely on the absence of causation is just one of many 
indications that the Hudson majority was bent upon accomplishing more than simply 
eliminating the exclusionary remedy for knock-and-announce violations.”). 
 Scalia then 
noted that the interests protected by the announcement rule 
included protecting human life and limb, preventing the 
 150 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 592. 
 151 Id. at 593. 
 152 See also Tomkovicz, the Future, supra note 9, at 1863-64 (The evidence found in 
Hudson’s home was “primary, immediately acquired products, not derivative evidence 
with a weakened connection to the unconstitutionally hasty entry.”). 
 153 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 593. 
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destruction of property, and protecting aspects of privacy and 
dignity that can be disturbed by a sudden entry. Scalia then 
distinguished these interests from the interest protected by the 
warrant requirement.154 When police violate the warrant 
requirement, Scalia explained, the government infringes a 
person’s right to “shield ‘their persons, houses, papers, and effects 
from the government’s scrutiny.”155 Exclusion of evidence obtained 
in violation of the warrant requirement “vindicates that 
entitlement.”156 The knock-and-announce rule, however, does not 
protect a person’s interest in precluding police from seizing 
evidence described in a valid warrant. Thus, Scalia concluded: 
“Since the interests that were violated in [Hudson] have nothing to 
do with the seizure of the evidence, the exclusionary rule is 
inapplicable.”157
The third basis for Hudson’s holding was that “the 
exclusionary rule has never been applied except where its 
deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.”
 
158 The 
origins of this amorphous balancing test dates back to Alderman 
v. United States,159
The objective of this section is not to assess the merits of 
Scalia’s legal reasoning in Hudson. Other scholars, including 
Professors Al Alschuler, Sharon Davies, Eric A. Johnson, Wayne 
LaFave, and James Tomkovicz, have already superbly performed 
that task, and we recommend reading their analyses.
 and the test has been a central element of the 
Court’s exclusionary rule cases ever since. 
160
                                                                                                                                  
 154 Id. at 593-94. 
 Rather, 
our goal is to consider what Hudson’s attenuation analysis means 
 155 Id. at 593 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV). 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 594. 
 158 Id. (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 159 394 U.S. 165 (1969). 
 160 See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 1.6(h) at 43-49 (4th ed. Supp. 2011-2012); 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 11.4 at 44-48 (4th ed. Supp. 
2011-2012); id. § 11.4 at 52-60; Eric A. Johnson, Causal Relevance in the Law of Search 
and Seizure, 88 B.U. L. REV. 113 (2008); Alschuler, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 27; 
Davies & Scanlon, supra note 34; Tomkovicz, the Future, supra note 9. For a thorough 
survey of the lower courts’ use of Hudson’s logic, see Christopher D. Totten, The 
Exclusionary Rule After Hudson v. Michigan: Mourning the Death of the Knock and 
Announce Rule, 46 No. 5 CRIM. L. BULL. art. 1 (Fall 2010). 
2012] NO MORE CHIPPING AWAY 1217 
for the future of suppression law. We think Hudson’s novel 
attenuation rule was designed to apply to search and seizure 
violations beyond the announcement rule. In addition, we believe 
that Scalia wrote Hudson to lay the foundation for abolishing 
suppression generally. In other words, Scalia’s analysis in Hudson 
is not a “good-for-this-train-only” ticket. Rather, it is intended 
specifically for use in future cases to bar suppression as a 
categorical matter, and Hudson itself, as a general matter, was 
structured to provide a blueprint for repealing the exclusionary 
rule when five Justices are ready to do so. 
B. Two Different Forms of Attenuation: Traditional and 
Hudson v. Michigan Attenuation 
From its inception, attenuation analysis was designed to 
curtail application of the exclusionary rule. The concept of 
attenuation originated in Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in 
Nardone v. United States161 as a way for the government to bypass 
the exclusionary rule and admit illegally acquired evidence. 
According to Frankfurter, it was “a matter of good sense” that the 
connection between an illegal search and the evidence proffered by 
the government at trial “may have become so attenuated as to 
dissipate the taint.”162 Although Nardone was not a Fourth 
Amendment case, and Frankfurter’s thoughts on attenuation were 
obiter dictum, twenty years later Wong Sun v. United States 
adopted Frankfurter’s analysis to determine when evidence 
obtained from a Fourth Amendment violation was subject to 
exclusion.163 Around the same time, Professor Anthony 
Amsterdam, a former Frankfurter clerk, characterized the 
attenuation doctrine as “foggy” and “inarticulately and 
unsystematically designed.”164 Yet, he recognized that the purpose 
of attenuation analysis was “to mark the point of diminishing 
returns of the deterrence principle” of the exclusionary rule.165
                                                                                                                                  
 161 308 U.S. 338 (1939). 
 
 162 Id. at 341. 
 163 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
 164 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. 
PA. L. REV. 378, 389-90 (1964). 
 165 Id. at 390. 
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As an exception to the exclusionary rule, traditional 
attenuation only applies to derivative evidence because the nexus 
between an illegal search and direct or primary evidence (e.g., 
evidence seized from the pocket of a person illegally arrested) “is 
both proximate and strong, not ‘remote’ or ‘attenuated.’”166 During 
the 1960s and 1970s, attenuation analysis “probed the strength of 
the connection between the police illegality and the evidence the 
prosecutor wished to introduce by examining the circumstances 
under which the evidence came into the hands of the police.”167 
But the Court’s rulings also rejected per se or absolute formulas 
proposed by the government to circumvent exclusion.168 As Justice 
Powell described it, “the question of attenuation inevitably is 
largely a matter of degree.”169
It is important to understand that the type of attenuation 
adopted in Hudson is not only novel and expansive,
 In sum, although designed to take 
some of the bite out of the exclusionary rule, traditional 
attenuation analysis, at least as practiced by the Court prior to 
Hudson, paralleled the deterrence purposes of the exclusionary 
rule. 
170
                                                                                                                                  
 166 Tomkovicz, the Future, supra note 9, at 1863. 
 but it also 
drastically differs from a traditional attenuation analysis. As 
Professor Tomkovicz explains in his recent book on constitutional 
exclusion: 
 167 Davies & Scanlon, supra note 34, at 1060. 
 168 For example, in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), the Illinois attorney 
general urged the Court to adopt a per se rule that Miranda warnings were sufficient 
to dissipate the taint of an illegal arrest and thus allow the admission of the 
defendant’s statement given while in police custody. Id. The Court rejected that rule 
and instead employed a multi-prong test to determine whether a confession was 
obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest. Id. at 603-04. Similarly, in United States v. 
Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978), the government argued that live witness testimony was 
never tainted fruit no matter how direct the nexus between an illegal search and the 
testimony. Id. Again, the Court rejected the proposed per se rule in favor of a multi-
factor balancing test. Id. at 274, 276-80. But cf. New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 21 
(1990) (deciding in what amounted to a per se rule, that where police have probable 
cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar the admission of a 
voluntary confession given by the suspect outside of his home, even though the 
confession is taken after an arrest in the home that violates the rule of Payton v. New 
York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)). The connection between the results in Hudson and Harris 
have been analyzed by Professor Eric Johnson. See Johnson, supra note 160. 
 169 Brown, 422 U.S. at 609 (Powell, J., concurring in part). 
 170 Tomkovicz, the Future, supra note 9, at 1863; Davies & Scanlon, supra note 34, 
at 1061. 
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”Attenuation” seems like a misnomer for this alternative 
version of the exception. The connection between the 
violation and the evidence at issue can be very close and 
very strong. Indeed, this offshoot of the attenuation 
doctrine encompasses even primary evidence acquired as 
an immediate result of a Fourth Amendment violation and 
is unconcerned with the culpability of the officers or the 
egregiousness of their transgression. Considering its very 
different character, it is at least odd to pair it with the 
traditional form of the attenuation.171
C. Extending Hudson’s Attenuation Logic Beyond the “Knock-
and-Announce” Context 
 
It is also imperative to appreciate how easily Hudson’s 
attenuation analysis can be employed to admit evidence in cases of 
other search and seizure violations. Under Hudson, the 
exclusionary rule applies only when excluding evidence serves the 
constitutional interest promoted by the Fourth Amendment rule 
that the police have failed to follow. The Court could extend 
Hudson’s logic to bar suppression in a number of contexts. 
1. Hudson and the “No Press” Rule 
The logic of Hudson’s attenuation rule bars exclusion when 
the manner of a police entry into a home violates the Constitution. 
Thus, exclusion is never appropriate when the police allow 
journalists or other third parties to accompany them when they 
enter a home to make an arrest or conduct a search. A decade ago, 
Wilson v. Layne found this practice unconstitutional because the 
Fourth Amendment requires that police actions in execution of a 
warrant be “related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion,” 
and, as a general matter, the presence of reporters in a home does 
not aid the police in executing a warrant.172
                                                                                                                                  
 171 TOMKOVICZ, supra note 1, at 51. 
 While Wilson did 
mention the “privacy” afforded the home, the Court was also 
careful to observe that the Fourth Amendment violation “is the 
presence of the media and not the presence of the police in the 
home,” and thus it was reserving the question “whether the 
exclusionary rule would apply to any evidence discovered or 
 172 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 611 (1999). 
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developed by the media representatives.”173
2. Hudson and the “Right-to-See-a-Warrant” Rule 
 Despite the ruling in 
Wilson, television news programs continue to show videos of police 
raiding private homes and businesses, indicating that Wilson is 
still being violated in some locales. But after Hudson, there is no 
reason to think the Court will countenance exclusion for this 
offense. The Court could easily use Hudson’s attenuation logic to 
conclude that suppression does not vindicate the interests for 
excluding the media and hold that the exclusionary rule is 
inapplicable. 
Similarly, the Court has not definitively decided whether a 
homeowner has a right, circumstances permitting, to inspect a 
warrant before police enter a home to effectuate a search or an 
arrest. Language from some of the Court’s rulings implicitly 
recognizes a homeowner’s right to inspect a warrant before police 
entry. Over forty years ago, Camara v. Municipal Court 
acknowledged the dilemma facing a homeowner when confronted 
with a municipal inspector’s demand to perform a warrantless 
search of his home: The homeowner “has no way of knowing 
whether enforcement of the municipal code involved requires 
inspection of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits of 
the inspector’s power to search, and no way of knowing whether 
the inspector himself is acting under proper authorization.”174
Similarly, Wilson v. Arkansas ruled that the common law 
knock-and-announce requirement was constitutionally based.
 
175 
One of the interests served by the common law announcement 
rule was to allow a homeowner the opportunity to demand 
identification from officers seeking entry and to allow the resident 
to explain to the officers that the person or premises were 
mistakenly described in the warrant.176
                                                                                                                                  
 173 Id. at 614 n.2. 
 Of course, these purposes 
could not be served if the homeowner had no right to see the 
warrant before police entry. 
 174 Camara v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967). 
 175 Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995). 
 176 See Charles P. Garcia, Note, The Knock and Announce Rule: A New Approach to 
the Destruction-of-Evidence Exception, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 687-88 (1993). 
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Finally, when Groh v. Ramirez explained why the presence of 
a search warrant serves a high function (that could not necessarily 
be vindicated by some other document not made available to the 
homeowner), the Court suggested that a homeowner could see the 
warrant “for her inspection” before police entry.177
To be sure, more recently in United States v. Grubbs, Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion observed in dictum that the Fourth 
Amendment imposed no requirement to present a homeowner 
with a warrant.
 These 
statements provide the basis for concluding that a homeowner has 
a constitutional right to see a warrant prior to entry. That right 
would protect, inter alia, an occupant’s interest in assuring that 
the entry was lawful, the occupant is informed of the scope of the 
power of the police to search or seize, and that the police are 
acting under proper authority. 
178 Justice Souter’s concurrence, however, pointed 
out that the Court had previously reserved that question in Groh 
v. Ramirez, and that it remained unsettled after Grubbs.179 Souter 
observed that displaying a warrant to a homeowner “assures the 
individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful 
authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the 
limits of his power to search.”180
Assuming the Court will find that the Fourth Amendment 
grants a homeowner a right to see a warrant before a police entry, 
Hudson’s attenuation logic ensures that exclusion will never be an 
appropriate remedy where police violate this right and discover 
evidence in a subsequent search. As in Hudson, the Fourth 
Amendment interests protected by a “right-to-see-a-warrant” are 
different from and “do not include the shielding of potential 
evidence from the government’s eyes.”
 
181 In fact, in United States 
v. Hector, the Ninth Circuit used Hudson’s attenuation reasoning 
to conclude that the exclusionary rule does not apply when the 
police fail to present the defendant with a search warrant.182
                                                                                                                                  
 177 Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004). 
 
 178 United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 98 (2006). 
 179 Id. at 101 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 180 Id. (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)). 
 181 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006). 
 182 United States v. Hector, 474 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 
U.S. 1104 (2008). 
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After obtaining a lawful warrant, Los Angeles police pried 
open Albert Hector’s door to search his apartment for drugs and 
related paraphernalia. During the search, the officers showed 
Hector a “Search Warrant Notice of Service,” which was not the 
actual search warrant and did not contain the address of the 
location to be searched or list the items to be seized. The police did 
not show Hector the warrant at any time during the search. At 
Hector’s apartment, the police found drugs, money, and a loaded 
handgun.183 The jury found Hector guilty of drug and weapons 
offenses based on evidence found in his apartment. After the jury 
verdict, Hector moved to suppress the evidence. The district court 
granted the motion and “held that the officers’ failure to serve 
Hector the search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment and 
required suppression of the evidence.”184
The Ninth Circuit reversed. Relying on Hudson’s attenuation 
analysis, the court ruled that regardless of whether the failure to 
serve a copy of the warrant was a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, exclusion was inappropriate.
 
185 The Ninth Circuit, 
embracing Hudson’s logic, found that “[t]he causal connection 
between the failure to serve the warrant and the evidence seized 
is highly attenuated, indeed nonexistent, in this case.”186 The 
court noted that the only legitimate interest served by presenting 
the warrant after Grubbs “is to head off breaches of peace by 
dispelling any suspicion that the search is illegitimate.”187 The 
court explained that this interest, like the interests promoted by 
the announcement rule, does not involve the “seizure of evidence 
described in the search warrant nor would it be vindicated by 
suppression of the evidence seized.”188 Accordingly, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that under Hudson’s logic, suppression was 
unwarranted.189
Similarly, the district court in United States v. Makki relied 
on Hudson’s attenuation logic and the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in 
Hector to hold that exclusion was not an appropriate remedy when 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 183 Id. at 1153. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. at 1155. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. (quoting United States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030, 1035 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. 
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the police failed to show the defendant the list of items to be 
seized pursuant to a search warrant.190 The court found that “the 
causal connection between any failure to provide Defendant with a 
list of the items to be seized and the evidence actually seized is 
‘highly attenuated, indeed non-existent.’”191 The court further 
explained that the interest promoted by presenting the list of 
items in the warrant—”head[ing] off breaches of the peace by 
dispelling any suspicion that the search is illegitimate . . . does not 
implicate the seizure of evidence . . . .”192 The court concluded that 
suppression would not vindicate the interest that was violated.193 
“[I]n light of the rationale of the exclusionary rule and the 
considerations set out by the Supreme Court in Hudson,” the 
district court found suppression an inappropriate remedy.194
Because the interests served by showing a warrant are 
separate from a person’s interest in precluding police from seizing 
evidence described in that warrant, Hudson’s reasoning easily 
extends to bar suppression after the police fail to present a search 
warrant. Thus, as some courts have already recognized, Hudson’s 
attenuation logic will ensure that even if the Court finds that the 
Fourth Amendment protects a person’s “right-to-see-a-warrant,” 
the exclusionary rule will not apply to violations of this right. 
 
3. Hudson and the “No Arbitrary Destruction of Property” Rule 
Hudson’s attenuation analysis would also seem to bar 
exclusion where police arbitrarily destroy property while 
executing a warrant. In United States v. Ramirez, the Court stated 
in dictum: “Excessive or unnecessary property destruction during 
a search may violate the [Fourth] Amendment, even though the 
entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the search not subject to 
suppression.”195
                                                                                                                                  
 190 United States v. Makki, No. 06-20324, 2007 WL 1100453, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 
12, 2007). 
 And Ramirez reserved whether, if breaking a 
window to enter a garage violated the Fourth Amendment, there 
was a “sufficient causal relationship” between the breaking and 
 191 Id. (quoting United States v. Hector, 474 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 66 (1998). 
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the discovery of evidence to justify suppression.196 However, even 
assuming a direct connection between the breaking and the 
discovery of evidence, Hudson’s attenuation theory would bar 
suppression because the constitutional interest protected 
herepreservation of propertyis unrelated to and does not 
“include the shielding of potential evidence from the government’s 
eyes.”197
Professor Tomkovicz has written that “[i]t would seem” that 
Hudson’s attenuation analysis is applicable “to violations of other 
[constitutional] rules that prescribe the constitutional manner of 
home entries or other searches.”
 
198
4. Hudson and the “Inventory Search” Rules 
 We agree with his conclusion, 
but without the cautious qualification. We see no principled 
difference in the conclusion that the announcement rule does not 
promote the “shield” function identified by Justice Scalia’s new 
attenuation theory, and the conclusion that the “no press” rule, 
the “right-to-see-a-warrant” rule, and the “no arbitrary 
destruction of property” rule, also do not promote the “shield” 
function. 
Professor Tomkovicz also believes that Hudson’s attenuation 
theory is potentially applicable “to any case involving evidence 
found as a result of an unconstitutional seizure of a person or 
property.”199
The Fourth Amendment’s prohibitions of unreasonable 
seizures of individuals and effects are arguably designed to 
serve liberty and possessory interests, respectively, not to 
shield potential evidence from government eyes. According 
to the logic of Hudson, because suppression does not serve 
the interests beneath those rules, the exclusionary rule is 
inapplicable.
 According to Tomkovicz: 
200
                                                                                                                                  
 196 Id. at 72 n.3. In Hudson, Justice Scalia, speaking for four Justices, viewed 
Ramirez’s reservation of this issue as a clear expression of the “proposition that an 
impermissible manner of entry does not necessarily trigger the exclusionary rule.” 
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 602 (2006). 
 
 197 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 593. 
 198 Tomkovicz, the Future, supra note 9, at 1864-65 (footnote omitted). 
 199 Id. at 1865. 
 200 Id. 
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Again, we agree with Tomkovicz’s judgment. Just as rational 
persons could determine that exclusion does not advance the 
purposes behind the constitutional bar on unreasonable seizures, 
rational persons could also decide that exclusion does not advance 
the purposes the Court has identified in its inventory search 
cases. In several cases, the Court has upheld the government’s 
power to conduct inventory searches of impounded cars and an 
arrestee’s effects. The searches involved can be quite extensive, 
like the search in Colorado v. Bertine, which included the detailed 
inspection of a backpack located inside a vehicle after the owner of 
the vehicle had been arrested for driving under the influence.201 
The Bertine Court, relying on earlier inventory search cases, 
South Dakota v. Opperman202 and Illinois v. Lafayette,203 held 
that the police do not violate the Fourth Amendment when they 
discover evidence pursuant to departmental standardized 
guidelines for inventory searches. These cases explain that neither 
the warrant nor probable cause requirements govern inventory 
searches.204 Because inventory searches are not designed to 
advance criminal investigations, traditional Fourth Amendment 
safeguards, like a magistrate’s independent determination that a 
search is proper or individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, are 
inapplicable.205
                                                                                                                                  
 201 Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 368-69 (1987). In the backpack, the officer 
came across a nylon bag containing metal canisters. Id. at 369. After opening the 
canisters, the officer found drugs, drug paraphernalia, and cash. Id. He also discovered 
cash in a sealed envelope located in a zippered outside pocket of the backpack. Id. The 
officer took the backpack and its contents to the police station, and Bertine was 
charged with possession and intent to sell the drugs. Id. 
 The Court has also explained that the purposes 
served by inventory searches include protecting a person’s 
property while in police custody; guarding the government against 
frivolous lawsuits over lost, stolen, or vandalized property; and 
 202 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976) (holding that the police’s search of a closed glove 
compartment pursuant to a routine inventory search of a lawfully impounded car did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
 203 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (holding that the inventory search of an arrestee’s personal 
effects at the police station did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement). 
 204 See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367 (noting that although vehicles are “effects” 
within the reach of the Fourth Amendment, the inherent mobility of cars and the 
reduced expectation of privacy within a vehicle makes “rigorous enforcement of the 
warrant requirement . . . impossible”). See generally Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640. 
 205 Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371. 
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protecting police safety.206
Keeping in mind the constitutional interests served by 
inventory searches, we see no reason why suppression is 
warranted when police conduct an illegal inventory search. As in 
Hudson, the interests protected by the Court’s inventory cases 
“are quite different—and do not include the shielding of potential 
evidence from the government’s eyes.”
 Thus, the Court has authorized 
inventory searches if law enforcement agencies provide 
standardized guidelines to control police discretion when 
conducting such searches. 
207 Thus, even if an officer 
conducts an unreasonable inventory search by ignoring 
standardized procedure, the Court will find suppression 
inappropriate. Because the interests served by inventory 
searches—safeguarding an owner’s property; shielding the 
government from lawsuits over lost, stolen, or vandalized 
property; and promoting police safety—”have nothing to do with 
the seizure of . . . evidence,” the Court will likely rule, using 
Hudson’s attenuation logic, that the exclusionary rule is 
inapplicable.208
In sum, while Justice Kennedy may believe that after 
Hudson the exclusionary rule remains functioning, there is good 
reason to believe that Hudson’s attenuation theory was designed 
to restrict future applications of the rule. We believe that 
Hudson’s attenuation theory will not be confined to the context of 
police violations of the knock-and-announce rule. By insisting that 
the suppression doctrine only applies when exclusion will promote 
the underlying Fourth Amendment value the police have violated, 
Hudson brazenly contradicted the notion that exclusion was not 
intended to vindicate a defendant’s constitutional rights.
 
209
                                                                                                                                  
 206 Id. at 372. 
 
 207 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006). 
 208 Id. at 594. 
 209 Professor Alschuler cogently explains why Hudson’s analysis contradicts a 
central tenant of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts: 
For more than forty years, the Court has denigrated “rights” theories of the 
[exclusionary] rule and contended that exclusion never vindicates the 
interests of the defendant before the court. The Court has insisted that 
exclusion is always what the Hudson Court said it never can be—a windfall 
awarded to a defendant for the sake of protecting the rights of others. If, as 
the Court has said repeatedly, exclusion cannot restore the defendant’s 
violated interests and is not designed to do so, Hudson’s declaration that 
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Moreover, Scalia’s opinion takes a long stride toward eventual 
abolition of the exclusionary rule. 
CONCLUSION 
We believe that the Court is already implementing its 
“reassessment” of the exclusionary rule. If we are right about the 
intentions of the Roberts Court, the Court will take a case 
involving a routine search and seizure violation and rule that the 
exclusionary rule does not apply unless there is proof of culpable 
or egregious police conduct. If this occurs, the exclusionary rule 
will no longer matter—nor will the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
exclusion is inappropriate unless it restores the defendant’s violated interests 
is simply a formula for abolishing the rule. 
Alschuler, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 27, at 1764 (footnote omitted). We believe it is 
incredible that Justice Scalia was unaware of the inconsistency between the conclusion 
that exclusion is not a personal right and his newly announced theory in Hudson. 
Scalia is simply too smart and savvy not to have noticed the conflict. This is another 
example of Scalia’s, and the conservative majority’s, willingness to find or create 
theories to promote their anti-exclusionary rule agenda. See id. at 1756 (“The Court 
shifts to whichever reason for exclusion gives it a reason not to exclude.”). 
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